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Introduction
Nishitani Keiji’s work entitled Shukyd tow a nanikax (What is 
Religion?), recently published in English translation under the title 
Religion and Nothingness, has been regarded by many scholars of 
East-West comparative thought as an epoch-making event in the 
philosophy of religion. Among the most significant contributions made 
by Nishitani in this work is his development of the Christian 
theological notion of kenosis or God’s “self-emptying” out of agape 
or impersonal love from the standpoint of such non-dual Mahayana 
Buddhist categories as kit or emptiness, muga or non-ego, jihi
or compassion and taishi or great death. The Biblical locus 
classicus for the Christian theological idea of kenosis or self-emptying 
is Paul’s letter to the Philippians, 2:5-8:
In your minds you must be the same as Christ Jesus. His state 
was divine, yet he did not cling to equality with God but emp­
tied himself to assume the condition of a slave, and became as
1 Nishitani Keiji, Shukyo towa nanika (What is Religion?).
Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, tr. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).
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men are; and being as all men are, he was humbler yet, even 
to accepting death, death on a cross.
Throughout the present essay 1 endeavor to clarify Nishitani’s use of 
this kenOsis hymn from the New Testament as a foundation for Bud­
dhist-Christian dialogue. In this context I trace back Nishitani’s com­
parative analysis of the Mahayana Buddhist sUnyatQ and Christian 
kenOsis traditions to its origins in the writings of Nishida KitarO. Also I 
show the extension of Nishida’s and Nishitani’s ideas of kenOsis in the 
writings of Abe Masao, who is yet another distinguished member of 
what has become known as the “Kyoto School” of Japanese Bud­
dhism. I then relate the thought of the Kyoto School in Japan to one of 
the most profoundly original yet highly controversial Christian 
thinkers of the twentieth century, namely, Thomas J. J. Altizer of the 
“Death-of-God” movement in theology. Indeed, more than any other 
Western thinker before him Altizer has attempted to radically 
reconstruct orthodox Christian theology in terms of the Mahayana 
Buddhist metaphysics of sQnyata or emptiness with its dialectical in­
terpenetration of samsOra and nirvana. Moreover, independently of 
the Kyoto School, Altizer has synthesized Christian and Buddhist 
teachings by focussing on the Biblical notion of kenOsis or self-empty­
ing as a standpoint for shattering all theological models of dualism and 
transcendence. Especially interesting here is Altizer’s argument that the 
Buddhist-Christian historical process of kenotic self-emptying is fully 
manifest in the radical innovations of modem art, literature and music. 
Finally, it will be emphasized that Altizer is also highly critical of Bud­
dhism, such that his own “kenotic Christology” provides us with an il­
luminating contrast to what might be termed “kenotic Buddhology” 
formulated by Nishida, Nishitani and the Kyoto School in Japan.
I
Although there has been considerable excitement over Nishitani Kei- 
ji’s use of kenOsis or “self-emptying” as a fundamental standpoint on 
which to base a Christian-Buddhist interfaith dialogue, few Western 
scholars are cognizant of the fact that this theme was earlier developed 
by his sensei Nishida KitarO (1860-1945). In Nishida’s penultimate 
essay Bashoteki ronri to shQkyOteki sekaikan (The Logic of Place and a
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Religious Worldview) we find the following passage on kenbsis:
A God who is simply self-sufficient is not the true God. In one 
aspect God must be thoroughly kenotic (self-emptying). A 
God that is both thoroughly transcendent and thoroughly im­
manent, thoroughly immanent and thoroughly transcendent, 
is a truly dialectical God. This can be called the true absolute. 
If it is said that God created the world from love, then God’s 
absolute love must be essential as the absolute self-negation 
of God, and is not opus ad extra.3
3 Nishida Kitard, Bashoteki ronri to shQkyOteki sekaikan (The Logic of Place and a 
Religious Worldview) from Nishida KitarO Zensha (The Complete Works of Nishida 
Kitard), 19 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965; 2nd edition), vol. XI, p. 399, lines 
3-5.
In this passage Nishida emphasizes that a merely transcendent and self- 
contained God is not truly God; for God is only God when in one 
aspect He “empties Himself” through kenbsis, thereby pouring out 
His total transcendence into total immanence. Moreover, God’s 
primordial act of kenbsis or “self-emptying” is precisely God’s act of 
creating the world out of love. God’s absolute love is therefore intrinsic 
to God’s absolute negation.
Nishida’s passage on the kenbsis or self-emptying of God appears in 
the context of explaining the dialectical (benshbhbteki inter­
relationship between the absolute and the relative, i.e., between Bud­
dha and sentient beings in Zen or between God and creatures in Chris­
tianity. In both the Mahayana Buddhist sunyatb and Christian kenbsis 
traditions the absolute must “empty out” into the relative due to com­
passion or love, just as the individual ego must “empty out” into the 
absolute to realize enlightenment or salvation. Similarly, God must 
undergo His own death or self-negation and pour Himself out into the 
world, just as the individual ego must undergo its own death or self­
negation and pour itself into the absolute. This mutual emptying out of 
the absolute into the relative and the relative into the absolute indicates 
that reality is free of any substance or own-being, and can only be de­
scribed as what Nishida terms mu no bashb or the “locus of
Nothingness.”
Nishida argues that in the “locus of Nothingness” the dialectical in­
terrelationship between the absolute and the relative must be defined in
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paradoxical terms as a “self-identity of absolute contradictions” (zet- 
tai mujunteki jikodOitsu )• Following Hegel’s
polemic, he asserts that the true absolute cannot simply transcend the 
relative or it would also be relative. The true absolute must possess its 
own self-negation. Consequently, the relative does not stand opposed 
to the absolute, but is the absolute's own self-negation. Since there can 
be nothing at all which opposes a true absolute, the absolute must be a 
self-identity of contradictories, i.e., an absolute affirmation through 
self-negation. Nishida further defines this paradoxical interrelationship 
between the absolute and the relative through what he terms, following 
Suzuki Dai set z, the Mahayana Buddhist “Prajnfiparamita Sutra logic 
of soku-hi (£P#),” which indicates a logic of “is/is not” or “affirma­
tion-negation.” He writes:
Buddhism expresses this paradox with the logic of “is/is not” 
(soku-hi), as is said in the Diamond Sutra:
Since all dharmas are not all dharmas, 
Therefore they are called all dharmas.
Since there is no Buddha, there is a Buddha.
Since there are no sentient beings,
Therefore there are sentient beings.4
4 ibid., pp. 398-99.
It is precisely at this point where Nishida introduces the passage on 
kenOsis cited previously. For Nishida understands the idea of kenOsis 
as a Christian theological variation of this same logic of soku-hi or “is/ 
is not” operative in the Mahayana Buddhist sUnyata tradition. Because 
the absolute must enter into self-negation, it paradoxically both “is” 
and “is not.” Accordingly, insofar as God fully “empties Himself’ 
thorough kenOsis, He both “is” and “is not” as an absolute affirma­
tion through self-negation.
II
In his work ShQkyO towa nanika (What is Religion?) Nishitani Keiji 
resumes Nishida Kitard's intercultural theme of kenOsis as the ground 
for a Buddhist-Christian interfaith dialogue. In the second chapter of 
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this work Nishitani discusses the concept of kenOsis or self-emptying in 
the context of analyzing the Christian idea of agape or non­
discriminating love, citing directly from the gospel of Matthew 5:43- 
48, which disavows the injunction to “love your neighbor and hate 
your enemy” and instead proclaims: “Love your enemies and pray for 
those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who 
is in heaven; for he makes His sun rise on the evil and the good, and 
sends rain on the just and the unjust. ... You, therefore, must be 
perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.” Nishitani proceeds to 
develop this Biblical idea of divine perfection as agape or non­
discriminating love in terms of the correlate notion of Christ’s ek- 
kenOsis or self-emptying, which is in turn based on the original kenOsis 
or self-emptying of God:
What is this non-discriminating love or agape which loves 
even enemies? In a word, it is “making oneself empty” 
(onore o munashikusuru koto). In the case of Christ it 
signified adopting the form of man and becoming a servant in 
accordance with the will of God. The ekkenOsis or “making 
himself empty” of Christ therefore has its origin in God.5
5 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO towa nanika, p. 67. All references to Nishitani’s work are 
my own translations based on the original Japanese edition of his text unless otherwise 
indicated.
6 ibid., p. 67.
Nishitani continuously asserts that the ekkenfisis of Christ has its 
origins in the kendsis of God. His polemic here is that although self­
emptying out of impersonal love may be taken as a characteristic of 
divine perfection, kenOsis or the condition of being self-emptied is 
essentially entailed from the beginning in the idea of the perfection of 
God, while ekkenOsis or the activity of self-emptying love as typified by 
Christ and commanded of man is the embodiment or practice of that 
perfection. He thus writes: “What is ekkenOsis for Christ is kenOsis for 
God. In the East this would be called antttman (Jap. muga) or non­
ego.”6 Moreover, he asserts that whereas Christ manifest the original 
perfection of God through the impersonal love by which he “emptied 
himself,” the Christian is said to practice or imitate that self-emptying 
perfection when he converts from human discriminating love at the 
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standpoint of ego to a divine nondiscriminating love at the standpoint 
of non-ego.7
7 ibid., pp. 67-68.
8 ibid., p. 69.
Nishitani then goes on to argue that the kenOsis-ekkenOsis whereby 
God “emptied Himself’ out of agape or non-discriminating love is the 
Christian theological variant of such radically non-dual Mahayana 
Buddhist categories as sUnyata (Jap. kti) or “emptiness,” anatman 
(muga) or “non-ego” and karuna (jihi) or “compassion”:
The non-discriminating love that makes the sun rise on evil as 
well as good, enemies as well as friends, includes, as stated 
previously, the quality of anatman (muga) or non-ego. Non­
ego designates the fundamental standpoint of Buddhism, 
where it is called mahaprajna (daichi or great wisdom 
and mahakaruna (daihi or great compassion. .. . There 
is no selfishness denoted by the term anatman (muga) or non- 
ego as well as sQnyatti (kQ) or “emptiness.”8
In a lengthy comment added to the English edition of his book, 
Nishitani argues that both the Christian kenOsis and Mahayana Bud­
dhist sQnyata traditions conceive of divine perfection as consisting of 
self-emptying and ego-negating love or compassion. While developing 
the Mahayana Buddhist tri-kaya or “three bodies” theory, he suggests 
that the Buddhist equivalent to the Christian idea of kenOsis or “self­
emptying” is sQnyata or “emptiness,” conceived as the original and 
essential nature of Buddha in his dharma-kaya or “truth body” aspect. 
The dharma-kaya is itself the ground of the sambhoga-kdya or 
“reward body,” conceived as the self-presentation of formless emp­
tiness as the Form of Buddha, i.e., the compassionate tathagata 
(“Thus Come”). This karuna or compassion is therefore grounded in 
fanyata or emptiness and has the essential meaning of anatman or non- 
ego in the sense of self-emptying out of impersonal love. Furthermore, 
the dharma-kaya is also the ground of the nirmana-kaya or “transfor­
mation body” of Buddha, conceived as the self-presentation of 
formless emptiness in its double form of man-Buddha, i.e., the 
historical Buddha. Nishitani argues that the appearance of the 
historical Buddha, like the appearance of Christ, essentially means an 
ekkenOsis or “making oneself empty” since the transition from 
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formless emptiness to determinate form involves non-ego and compas­
sion. Assuming form means a self-determination and self-negation, 
i.e., a kenotic “self-emptying” out of egoless compassion as a 
disclosure of the original emptiness. Nishitani summarizes this entire 
discussion when he finally asserts: “Throughout the basic thought of 
Buddhology, especially in the Mahayana tradition, the concepts of 
emptiness, compassion and non-ego are seen to be inseparably con­
nected. The Buddhist way of life as well as its way of thought are 
permeated with kenosis and ekkendsis. ”9
9 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, p. 288, fn. This passage appears only in 
a long footnote added to the English edition of Nishitani’s work.
10 Nishitani Keiji, ShakyO towa nanika, pp. 311-12.
Nishitani, like Nishida, regards both the Christian kenosis and 
Mahayana Buddhist siinyatd traditions as providing a standpoint by 
which to critique any substantialist notion of reality conceived as con­
sisting of self-sufficient entities, whether this be a self-sufficient and 
transcendent God or a self-sufficient and independent ego. This is to 
say that both Christian kendsis and Buddhist tflnyata indicate a self­
emptying not only of the transcendent God postulated by theism, but 
also a self-emptying of the separate ego of Cartesianism. For this 
reason he argues throughout his work that both the “theocentric” 
(kami-chashinteki and “egocentric” (jiko-chtishinteki
standpoints are dissolved and emptied out in the ultimate stand­
point of sdnyatQ or emptiness, i.e., what he also refers to following 
Nishida as mu no basho or the “locus of nothingness.” Hence, 
Nishitani criticizes the Aristotelian concept of perfection as “self- 
sufficiency,” arguing against both the self-sufficiency of a transcendent 
God and of an independent ego, maintaining instead that true perfec­
tion lies in an “emptying” (munashikushite !£L< LX) of self:
Aristotle’s grasp of divine reality and its self-sufficiency is sim­
ply one aspect, namely, an abstraction of the transcendent 
side alone. Self-sufficiency and perfection are not simply a 
matter of being complete and self-sufficient in oneself... . 
True self-sufficiency cannot be egotistic but instead must be 
what one could term the “individual non-ego.” It must be a 
true self-sufficiency in the sense of an “emptying” 
(munashikushite) of self which makes all things to be.10
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In this context he further argues that a shift in the concept of divine 
perfection from “self-sufficiency” to “self-emptying” corresponds to 
the shift from Hinayana Buddhism to Mahayana Buddhism with its in­
terrelated doctrines of emptiness, non-ego and compassion. Moreover, 
it corresponds to a shift from the discriminating love which the Greeks 
called eros to the non-discriminating love which the Christians termed 
agape. He concludes that this shift to a concept of divine perfection as 
“making oneself empty” (onore o munashikusuru koto <'t
& ci £) in both the Mahayana Buddhist sUnyata and Christian kenOsis 
traditions bespeaks a conversion to a completely new view of Buddha 
or God, as well as of man.11
11 ibid., p. 312.
12 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, p. 291, fn. This reference to D. T. 
Suzuki appears only in a footnote included in the English edition of Nishitani’s work.
13 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO Iowa nanika, p. 73.
Nishitani, like Nishida, argues that a real kenotic God can be truly 
comprehended only in terms of a Mahayana Buddhist logic of soku-hi 
(sive-non) or “is/is not.” Following Nishida he maintains that the ab­
solute cannot merely transcend the relative or it will also be relative. 
The true absolute must possess the relative as its own self-negation. For 
this reason, Nishitani repeatedly argues for the necessity of shifting 
from a standpoint of nihility or “relative nothingness” (sOtaiteki mu tfi 
where the absolute is opposed to the relative, to the ultimate 
standpoint of true “emptiness” (kQ) or “absolute nothingness” (zettai 
mu wherein the relative does not stand opposed to the abso­
lute but is the absolute’s own self-negation. Hence, in the standpoint 
of absolute nothingness, God cannot be simply transcendent or 
self-sufficient, but rather, He must “empty Himself* and enter into 
self-negation as a self-identity or absolute contradictories. It is this con­
tradictory or paradoxical structure of the self-emptying and self­
negating kenotic God which must be described through a Mahayana 
Buddhist logic of soku-hi or “is/is not.” Nishitani quotes D. T. Suzuki 
who first formulated this Mahayana Buddhist logic of soku-hi which 
states: “A is not A and therefore A is A. A is A because it is non-A.”12 13
An example of this form of soku-hi logic can be seen in Nishitani’s 
discussion of Meister Eckhart’s distinction between God and 
Godhead. According to Eckhart, one must “stand emptied” 
(ledigsteheri)'3 of both God and creatures so as to break through to the 
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“Godhead” (Gottheit) of absolute nothingness. Yet, with his logic of 
soku-hi Nishitani further argues that the Godhead is the place within 
God where God is not God:
Godhead is the place within God where God is not God. 
Although this seems to contradict what I said previously 
about Godhead being what God is in Himself, in fact there 
two assertions are the same. To say that God is what God is in 
Himself is precisely in that absolute nothingness in which 
God is not Himself means that ecstasy applies to the existence 
of God as well as of man.14
14 ibid., pp. 77-78. 15 ibid., p. 277.
16 Abe Masao, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata” (delivered at the Second Con­
ference on East-West Religious Encounter, ” “Paradigm Shifts in Buddhism and 
Christianity” held in Honolulu, Hawaii. January 3-11, 1984), p. 13.
Here, using Heideggerian language, Nishitani speaks of ekstasis or 
“ecstasy” (in the sense of “standing-out” into nothingness of 
boundless openness) as a characteristic applying to both God and the 
self. In the general context of Nishitani’s analysis, ekstasis or standing 
out into nothingness is used synonymously with the term kenOsis or 
self-emptying. Due to its ekstatic or kenotic nature, Godhead is what 
God is in Himself, precisely since it is the emptiness or absolute 
nothingness in which God is not Himself. Because the ekstasis or 
kenOsis of Godhead signifies that God is fundamentally self-emptying 
and self-negating in character, God is not God; yet, precisely because 
He is not, God is God, since His essential function is that of self-empty­
ing out of impersonal love. Moreover, the enlightened self is also fully 
ekstatic or kenotic in character in the sense that it “empties out” into 
the boundless openness of absolute nothingness, and therefore can 
similarly be described only through a paradoxical logic of soku-hi. For 
this reason Nishitani asserts: “seif is not self, therefore it is self.”15
It is from the standpoint of this same Mahayana Buddhist logic of 
soku-hi or “is-is not” that the Kyoto School interprets the kenotic-ek- 
kenotic self-emptying of Jesus Christ. In his paper entitled “Kenotic 
God and Dynamic Sunyata” Abe Masao emphasizes that “we should 
understand the doctrine of Christ’s kenOsis to mean that Jesus Christ as 
the Son of God is essentially and fundamentally self-emptying or self­
negating.”16 He then argues that Jesus Christ “is essentially and fun­
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damentally true man and true God at one the same time in his dynamic 
work and function of self-emptying.”17 In this context, Abe articulates 
the paradoxical soku-hi nature of the kenotic Christ when he states: 
“Son of God is not Son of God (for he is essentially self-emptying): pre­
cisely because he is not, Son of God is Son of God (for he always works 
as Christ, the Messiah in his function of self-emptying).”18
17 ibid., p. 13.
18 ibid.
19 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO towa nanika, p. 109.
M Abe Masao, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata,” p. 19.
21 ibid., p. 23.
Finally, it can be asserted that Nishida, Nishitani and Abe of the 
Kyoto School have endeavored to formulate what might be called a 
“kenotic Buddhology,” wherein the key Mahayana Buddhist principle 
of sunyata is itself defined in fully kenotic terms as a dynamic process 
of “self-emptying” out of egoless compassion or impersonal love. As 
Nishitani states: “Emptiness in the sense of sUnyatO (Jkti) is emptiness 
only when it empties itself even of the standpoint that represents it as 
some “thing” that is emptiness, so that originally it is self-empty­
ing.”19 In his paper “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata” Abe also 
emphasizes that sunyata cannot be reified, absolutized or substantializ­
ed in any way whatsoever and is that which can never be objectified as 
some independently existing thing. For this reason, Abe states that 
“the notion of Sunyata may be in Buddhism, after Martin Heidegger 
who puts a cross-mark X on the term Sein (Sem) in order to show the 
unobjectifiability of Sein, we should also put a cross-mark on the term 
Sunyata, that is, JteyafS?’20 Hence Abe argues that Buddhist tonyata, 
or as it were, denotes not an objectifiable reality, but rather a
dynamic process of kenOsis or self-emptying:
Sunyata is fundamentally non-Sunyata with a cross-mark. 
This means that true Sunyata empties not only everything 
else, but also empties itself. Throughout its self-emptying it 
makes everything to exist as it is and to work as it does. 
Sunyata should not be understood in its noun form but in its 
verbal form because it is a pure and dynamic function of all­
emptying.21
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Thus when SQnyata is fundamentally non-sQnyata with a cross-mark, 
it must be understood in terms of the paradoxical Mahayana Buddhist 
logic of soku-hi or “is/is not.” Since sunyata empties not only 
everything else but also itself it is not sQnyata; yet precisely because it is 
not, it is SQnyata, since it is only conceivable as a dynamic process of 
self-emptying or self-negation. It is this “kenotic Buddhology” for­
mulated by Nishida, Nishitani and Abe of the Kyoto School in Japan 
whereby sQnyata is defined as a process of self-emptying out of non­
ego and compassion which I will now compare as well as contrast to the 
“kenotic Christology” developed by Thomas J. J. Altizer in the West.
Ill
The radically dialectical “Death-of-God” theology of Thomas J. J. 
Altizer, inspired by Hegel, Blake and Nietzsche in the West as well as 
Buddhism and Oriental mysticism in the East, represents the first com­
prehensive effort to reconstruct Christian theology focussing on the 
Biblical notion of kenOsis as its fundamental principle. At the outset of 
his work The Gospel of Christian Atheism he states his intent to frame 
“a consistent kenotic Christology.”22 Like Nishida, Nishitani and the 
Kyoto School, Altizer directs his own criticism against the Aristotelian 
and Scholastic definition of God as actus purus or “pure act,” com­
prehended as a fully transcendent and self-sufficient Lord who is com­
pletely isolated from the world.23 The departure point for his rejection 
of the wholly other, transcendent and self-sufficient God of Judaism 
and orthodox Christianity is Nietzsche’s prophetic declaration that 
“God is dead.” Nietzsche condemned the Christian God as an op­
pressive deity, proclaiming that only by the death of God can mankind 
be emancipated from this tyranny. In Altizer’s words:
22 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1966), p. 11.
23 ibid., p. 62.
Nietzsche’s protest against Christianity like Blake’s and 
Hegel’s, is fundamentally directed against the Christian God. 
It is God himself who is the transcendent enemy of the 
fullness and the passion of man’s life in the world, and only 
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through God’s death can humanity be liberated from that 
repression.24
24 ibid., p. 22.
25 ibid., p. 136.
26 ibid., p. 112.
The God which Nietzsche condemned was not merely the Christian 
God, but also the metaphysical notion of a supra-sensory world in 
general developed by the Platonic tradition. Nietzsche’s “revaluation 
of all values” was therefore directed towards the “death of God” as 
the supra-sensory value common to Christianity and Platonism alike. 
Although Nietzsche prided himself as being the Antichrist and the com­
plete inversion of all Christianity represents, Altizer nonetheless 
regards him as the prophetic voice for a radically new Christian vision. 
Indeed, for Altizer an acceptance of the “death of God” is the starting 
point for a fully kenotic Christology: “Only by accepting and even will­
ing the death of God in our own experience can we be liberated from a 
transcendent beyond, an alien beyond which has been emptied and 
darkened by God’s self-annihilation in Christ.”25
As indicated above, Altizer understands the “death of God” as signi­
fying the act of kendsis whereby God fully “empties Himself’ into the 
world such that He pours out His total transcendence into total im­
manence. Altizer’s kenotic theology is essentially Christological in that 
it focusses on the Incarnation and Crucifixion of Jesus Christ as the ma­
jor events of salvation history whereby God “emptied Himself’ and 
thus completed the process of kenotic self-emptying which began with 
the act of Creation. He therefore writes that “the Incarnation and 
Crucifixion are understood as a dual process, a kenotic or negative pro­
cess whereby God negates his primordial and transcendent epiphany 
thereby undergoing a metamorphosis into a new and immanent 
form.”26 Hence, for Altizer the Incarnation and Crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ represents God’s self-annihilation and self-sacrifice, i.e., God’s 
act of self-emptying or self-negation whereby He dies to His 
transcendence and becomes all in all as an immediate and total 
presence in the actual moment.
Altizer points to Hegel’s dialectic of Spirit (Geist) as providing the 
theoretical basis for his kenotic Christology, stating that Hegel is “the 
only thinker who made the kenotic movement of the Incarnation the 
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core and foundation of his thinking.”27 He traces Hegel’s dialectic of 
Spirit to the Christian mysticism of Meister Eckhart, who saw the 
Godhead as eternally generating each individual soul as the Son of 
God. Like the Kyoto School of Japan, Altizer recognizes Eckhart’s 
Christian mysticism as genuinely kenotic, insofar as the Godhead 
pours out its transcendent fullness into total immanence in the interior 
depths of each individual soul. Thus, he asserts that “the writings of 
Eckhart... are profoundly grounded in the kenotic self-emptying and 
self-abandonment of God. The self-emptying becomes realized in us 
when we are poor and abandoned, for then the fullness of God must be 
born in us, and God gives birth to me as Himself.”28 In a section entitl­
ed “KenOsis” from The Gospel of Christian Atheism Altizer argues 
that Eckhart’s radical expression of Christian mysticism was driven 
underground by the ecclesiastical authorities of the church, finally sur­
facing again in Jacob Boehme, who in turn “provided the germinal 
source for the one thinker who created a conceptual portrait of the in­
carnate or kenotic movement of God: Hegel.”29 Altizer writes that 
“Hegel conceived of the ‘false infinite’ or the impassive and unmoving 
Absolute as the ultimate source of alienation.”30 That is to say, a mere­
ly transcendent absolute which stands opposed to the finite itself 
becomes finite, i.e., what Hegel calls the “false infinite,” a notion 
which functions as the ultimate source of existential alienation between 
God and man. According to Hegel’s dialectical theology of absolute 
Spirit then, an absolute which is truly infinite must contain the finite as 
its own self-negation. Altizer develops in detail Hegel’s dialectical con­
cept of God or Spirit as the kenotic process of self-emptying or self­
negation whereby Spirit becomes its own other and realizes itself 
through that other: “Historians of philosophy tell us that the truly uni­
que ground of Hegel’s thinking is his dialectical understanding of pure 
or radical negation, a self-negation of Spirit in which Spirit kenot- 
ically becomes its own other, existing as the actual opposite of its 
own original or initial identity.”31 He adds: “Accordingly, Spirit is 
27 ibid., p. 24.
28 Thomas J. J. Altizer, History as Apocalypse (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1966), p. 116.
29 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 63.
30 ibid., p. 22.
31 ibid., pp. 64-65.
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the kenotic or emptying process of negativity; as such it is the true 
actuality of the world.”32 Altizer directly cites Hegel’s work The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit which employs the actual language of 
kenOsis, speaking of the “kenOsis of eternal Being” whereby Spirit 
empties out into the world and thereby posits its own self-negation.33 
Moreover, he develops Hegel’s understanding of the dialectical self­
emptying or self-negation process of Spirit in terms of the Logos, i.e., 
the Christ or Incarnate Word which when spoken fully empties itself. 
Hegel writes of Spirit: “In this emptying of itself, in this kenOsis, it is.. . 
the ‘Word,’ the Logos, which when spoken empties the speaker of 
himself, outwardizes him, and leaves him behind emptied.”34
32 ibid., p. 63.
” ibid., p. 65.
34 ibid., p. 68.
35 ibid., p. 67.
36 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The New Apocalypse: The Radical Christian Vision of 
William Blake (Michigan: The Michigan State University Press, 1967), Chapter II en­
titled “Incarnation and Kenosis,” p. 74.
Altizer further develops this Hegelian dialectical process of kenotic 
self-emptying or self-negation as the “agape or total self-giving of 
God.”35 He maintains that insofar as orthodox Christianity has con­
ceived of God as completely transcendent and self-sufficient, it has 
been unable to incorporate this doctrine of agape as the primary core 
of Christian faith. Hence, he argues that the Christian proclamation 
that God is love found in the gospel of John as well as the Christian 
idea of agape or total self-giving of God can only be realized upon the 
basis of a Hegelian dialectical notion of Spirit as fundamentally 
kenotic or self-emptying in character.
Furthermore, Altizer clarifies that the activity of kenOsis or self-emp- 
tying out of agape or self-giving love involved in the Incarnation of 
Jesus Christ is in fact a dual or two-way process of self-emptying 
whereby God empties out into man and man empties out into God:
Consequently, the full meaning of the Incarnation is that the 
Incarnation is a dual and dialectical process whereby God 
empties Himself of Himself and becomes man and man emp­
ties Himself of his historical particularity and his individual 
selfhood and becomes God.36
In his work entitled Total Presence Altizer argues that this dual kenotic 
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process which empties both God and man involves the total dissolution 
of both a transcendent center as well as an interior center: “Just as a 
purely anonymous vision is impossible apart from the loss or dissolu­
tion of an interior center, so likewise it is impossible apart from the loss 
or reversal of a transcendent ground or center.”37 Both the transcen­
dent center of a self-sufficient God and the interior center of a self-en- 
closed ego are dissolved through the kenotic emptying process into an 
anonymous total presence as all in all: “A kenotic or self-emptying 
center is now passing into a full and final actuality, and as that actuali­
ty realizes itself in our own midst, a pure negativity becomes ... a total 
presence which even now is becoming all in all.”38
37 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Total Presence (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), p. 
36.
38 ibid., pp. 96-97.
39 Katherine Kuh, Break-Up: The Core of Modern Art (London: Cory, Adams & 
Mackay Ltd., 1965), p. 11.
40 ibid. For a discussion on the “break-up” reflected in the down-beat tempos and
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Altizer’s book Total 
Presence is its argument that the kenotic self-emptying of both a self- 
sufficient God and a self-enclosed ego into a field of total presence 
devoid of all transcendent and interior centers is itself reflected in the 
revolutionary innovations of modern art, literature and music. 
Specifically, he maintains that the kenotic self-emptying of all 
metaphysical centers, including all transcendent or interior centers, is 
fully expressed in modern painting as well as the epic literature of 
James Joyce and the ecstatic improvisations of American Jazz. 
Altizer’s position can be supported by reference to scholarly studies on 
the subject such as Break-Up: The Core of Modem Art by Katherine 
Kuh, who writes: “The art of our century has been characterized by 
shattered surfaces, broken color, segmented compositions, dissolving 
forms and shredded images. ... during the last hundred years, every 
aspect of art has been broken up—color, light, pigment, form, line, 
content, space, surface and design.”39 Throughout this work, Kuh 
argues that the tendency towards diffusion, dissolution and decen­
tralization is manifest not only in the “break-up” exhibited by modern 
painting and sculpture, but also by the disconnected stream-of-con- 
sciousness novels of James Joyce and the syncopated rhythms of 
jazz.40 Altizer’s description of the total shattering of all theocentric
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and anthropocentric images in modern art must therefore be regarded 
as belonging to this general process of break-up or dissolution 
characterizing the painting, literature, music and other art forms of the 
twentieth century. However, Altizer’s most significant contribution 
here is to ground the general break-up at the core of modern art in a 
systematic metaphysical theology of kenosis or self-emptying.
Altizer asserts that just as there is a dissolution of all transcendent 
and interior centers into a field of total presence in the Zen-influenced 
sumie inkwash landscapes of East Asian art, so, likewise, there is a 
radical kenotic self-emptying of both God and man in modem impres­
sionist, cubist and abstract expressionist painting. For example, he 
writes:
Both God and man seem wholly absent from Monet’s land­
scapes, but once we realize that we are confronting a total 
presence in his paintings, then we can be aware that this may 
well be a presence comprehending not only nature, but also 
both the human and divine.41
syncopated rhythms of improvisational jazz music as well as the fragmented stream-of- 
consciousness literature of James Joyce in their relation to modern art see especially 
pp. 7, 57, 60 and 71.
41 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Total Presence, pp. 30-31.
42 Thomas J. J. Altizer, History as Apocalypse, p. 210.
43 ibid., p. 219.
Altizer further argues that this kenotic self-emptying of both God and 
man or radical dissolution of both transcendent and interior centers in 
modern painting is also manifest in modem literary trends, 
culminating in the total break-up of form and content in James Joyce’s 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, In these two works Joyce shatters all 
theocentric images representing God’s transcendence with the language 
of blasphemy. In Altizer’s words: “Joyce’s blasphemy is directed 
against the primal center and ground of its own world.”42 For this 
reason, Joyce can proclaim the death of God with his blasphemous in­
vocation: “Our father who art not in heaven.”43 This total dissolution 
of all metaphysical centers is seen by Altizer as achieving its literary 
consummation in the “chaosmos” of Finnegans Wake. To give an in­
dication of the shattering of ego-consciousness or self-emptying of an 
interior center into a new and universal humanity represented by Fin-
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negarts Wake, one need only consider the book’s epic hero H. C. E., the 
universal “everyman” whose initials stand for “HERE COMES 
EVERYBODY.”44 This dissolution of all metaphysical centers or ab­
solutes accomplished by Joyce’s work is developed in detail by M. Nor­
ris in a book entitled The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake. 
Norris writes: “The formal elements of the work .. . represent a 
decentered universe, one that lacks the center that defines, gives mean­
ing, designates and holds the structure together.”45 46Hence, as Altizer 
points out: “Samuel Beckett justly says that Finnegans Wake is 
purgatorial in the ‘absolute absence of the Absolute.’ ’,46
44 ibid., p. 224. Also, see James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (New York: The Viking 
Press, Penguin Books, 1939), p. 32.
45 Margot Norris, The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake (Baltimore and Lon­
don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 120-21.
46 Thomas J. J. Altizer, History as Apocalypse, p. 226.
47 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Total Presence, p. 105.
48 ibid., p. 106.
In the final chapter of Total Presence Altizer argues that although 
various Eastern and Western contemplative disciplines function to 
redirect consciousness toward the innermost interiority of the self, such 
methods culminate in a total dissolution of interiority and a full 
kenotic emptying of the self: “Manuals of meditation East and West 
call for a deep and profound movement within, but that is not a move­
ment deeper into ego or self-consciousness, it is rather a movement 
which leaves self-consciousness and ego behind.”47 He further remarks 
on the depth of solitude experienced through inner meditation, stating: 
“Genuine solitude is a voyage into the interior, a loss reversing every 
manifest or established center.”48 Altizer concludes this chapter with a 
memorable discussion on the kenotic self-emptying realized through 
the radical innovations of twentieth century music, arguing that the 
complete shattering and dissolution of our interior center into an im­
mediacy of total presence is high-lighted in the ecstatic improvisations 
of American Jazz:
Perhaps nowhere is the immediacy of a total presence more 
manifestly present than in the fullest moments of American 
Jazz, and it is significant that jazz is the only art which is the 
fusion between an archaic spirit and a modern art. ... no in-
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terior is present when jazz is fully released.... The power em­
bodied in jazz violently shatters our interior.49
49 ibid., p. 107.
50 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences,” in Richard Macksey and Eugene Donato, eds.. The Languages of Criticism 
and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 256.
51 ibid., p. 249.
According to Altizer then, it is in such a way that the break-up at the 
core of modern art, literature and music reflects the historical process 
of kenOsis or self-emptying whereby all transcendent and interior 
centers are dissolved into an immediacy of total presence as all in all.
IV
On the basis of what has been said above it can be asserted that 
Altizer employs the Christian theological language of kenOsis or self­
emptying in a manner which at once suggests what Jacques Derrida has 
called the language of “decentering,” insofar as kenotic language 
signifies the total dissolution of all metaphysical absolutes or centers. 
Derrida express his theme of decentering as “the stated abandonment 
of all reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged reference, to an 
origin, or to an absolute arche.”50 He further asserts that his project of 
decentering or the critical deconstruction of all metaphysical centers 
emerged as the development of a major “rupture” in the history of 
structure, which took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, heralded especially by Nietzsche’s destruction of all ax­
iological-ontological systems as well as Heidegger’s destruction of tradi­
tional metaphysics and onto-theology. Hence, Derrida writes: “The 
whole history of the concept of structure, before the rupture I spoke of 
must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center.”51 
He adds that although the history of metaphysical structure has run 
through a long series of “centers” like substance, subject, ego, con­
sciousness, God or man, “it was necessary to begin to think that there 
was no center.” Consequently, Derrida endeavors to deconstruct the 
various “centrisms” which have afflicted Western philosophical think­
ing such as ethnocentrism, theocentrism, anthropocentrism, phallocen-
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trism, logocentrism, and so forth, although it is egocentrism or the 
primacy given to the ego in experience which especially becomes the ob­
ject of his critical deconstructive analysis.
In the case of Altizer’s radical Christian theology, the kenotic self­
emptying of both God and the ego is repeatedly described as a total 
dissolution of all transcendent and interior centers. Moreover he has 
argued that this dissolution of all transcendent and interior centers is 
reflected in the break-up or shattering of all God-centered and man­
centered images in modern painting and literature in a way reminiscent 
of certain styles of East Asian art. Indeed, this movement towards 
“break-up” at the core of modern art must be comprehended as also 
belonging to what Derrida has described as a “rupture” in the history 
of structure. Altizer’s position at once approximates Nishitani’s 
dissolution and emptying out of both the theocentric as well as the 
egocentric or anthropocentric standpoints in the ultimate standpoint 
sQnyatO or emptiness, i.e., what he terms following Nishida mu no 
basho or the “locus of nothingness.” Thus, Nishitani writes that in the 
standpoint of sQnyatG or emptiness “the theocentric standpoint, as 
represented by Christianity, and the anthropocentric standpoint of 
secularism both find themselves presently at the edge of mutual dissolu­
tion.”52 Abe Masao also argues that every metaphysical center, in­
cluding the transcendent center represented by theocentrism and the in­
terior center represented by anthropocentrism or egocentrism, must all 
be dissolved and emptied out in the standpoint of sunyata. In his essay 
“Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata” Abe therefore writes: “Sunyata 
indicates a boundless openness without any fixed center. Sunyata is 
free from any anthropocentrism, cosmocentrism and theocentrism. It 
is not oriented by any kind of centrism. Only in this way is emptiness 
possible.”53 Hence, it can be stated that both Altizer and the Kyoto 
School have utilized the theological language of kenOsis in order to 
critically deconstruct all fixed metaphysical centers, culminating in the 
radical dissolution of all transcendent and interior centers into an im­
mediacy of total presence wherein the center is everywhere.
52 Nishitani Keiji, ShakyO towa nanika, p. 250.
” Abe Masao, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata,” p. 20.
The kenotic theologies formulated by Altizer in the West and the 
Kyoto School in the East have both been profoundly influenced by the 
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total shattering of all images of transcendence and interiority which 
resulted from Nietzsche’s philosophical sledgehammer during the late 
nineteenth-century. What is especially remarkable here is that both 
Altizer and the Kyoto School have related Nietzsche’s smashing of all 
God-centered and man-centered images to the Christian theological no­
tion of kenOsis or self-emptying as well as to the Buddhist idea of 
silnyatd or emptiness. Throughout his writings Altizer frequently re­
lates his notion of the kenotic Christ not only to the emptiness and 
non-ego of Buddha but also to Nietzsche’s Dionysus, the Greek deity of 
ekstasis or ecstasy. Like the ecstatic Dionysus, the kenotic Christ fully 
“empties Himself” into the world and thereby pours out God’s total 
transcendence into total immanence as a total presence in the fullness 
and immediacy of the actual moment. Altizer further argues that Nietz­
sche’s shattering of all theocentric and egocentric images culminates in 
his vision of “Eternal Recurrence.” However, he emphasizes that 
“Eternal Recurrence is neither a cosmology nor a metaphysical idea: it 
is Nietzsche’s symbol of the deepest affirmation of existence, of Yes- 
saying.”54 He further clarifies Nietzsche’s idea of Eternal Recurrence 
as representing an ultimate existential affirmation of life in the present 
moment by his assertion: “Such a love of the world is a total affirma­
tion of life in the present: but in totally affirming the present we must 
will that it recur, and that it recur eternally the same.”55 In this con­
text, Altizer makes explicit the relationship between his own kenotic 
Christology and the teachings of Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s prophet of 
Dionysus, when he writes:
54 Thomas J. J. Altizer, “Theology and the Death of God,” in Thomas J. Altizer 
and William Hamilton, eds., Radical Theology and the Death of God (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 99.
35 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 155.
36 ibid., p. 155.
Can we join Zarathustra in his hymn of praise to joy? .. . But 
this is to ask the Christian if he dares to open himself to the 
Christ who is fully present, the Christ who has completed a 
movement from transcendence to immanence, who is 
kenotically present in the fullness and immediacy of the ac­
tual moment before us.56 *
Thus Altizer asserts that the radical Christian atheist who has willed 
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the “death of God” as a kenotic movement from transcendence to im­
manence and instead has accepted the existential idea of Eternal Recur­
rence must now “affirm the fullness and immediacy of the present mo­
ment as the life and energy of Christ.”57
37 ibid., p. 157.
51 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO towa nanika, p. 259.
59 ibid., p. 140.
60 ibid., p. 236.
In the final chapter of his book ShQkyO towa nanika Nishitani also 
emphasizes the total shattering of all “God-centered” and “man­
centered” orientations by Nietzsche’s sledgehammer of Eternal Recur­
rence. He writes:
Not only the “man-centered” (ningen-chQshinteki) but also 
the “God-centered” (shin-choshinteki) mode of being has to 
be smashed, Nietzsche would claim, by the sledgehammer of 
the idea of Eternal Recurrence. Only when every kind of op­
tical illusion has been shattered through this “transnihilism” 
does the standpoint of Great Affirmation and Great Life 
come to light.38
For Nishitani and the Kyoto School, both God and the ego are 
kenotically emptied out in the field of sUnyatO or emptiness, which is 
itself comprehended as the field of Great Affirmation where we can say 
Yes to all things. This is clarified in chapter four of Nishitani’s book en­
titled **KU no tachiba” (The Standpoint of Emptiness) where he writes: 
“Emptiness might be called the field of ‘beification’ (Ichtung) in con­
trast to nihility which is the field of ‘nullification’ (Nichtung). If we 
speak in Nietzschean terms, this field of beification is the field of Great 
Affirmation (kotei no ba), where we can say yes to all things.”* 59 60For 
this reason then, Nishitani regards the dissolution of all transcendent 
and interior centers as well as the total affirmation of life in the present 
moment depicted by Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recurrence as achiev­
ing a close structural proximity to the Mahayana Buddhist philosophy 
of s'UnyatO or emptiness. Speaking of Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence, Nishitani writes: “It must be interpreted as one of the cur­
rents of Western thought to come closest to the Buddhist standpoint of 
sQnyata.ttW Similarly, Altizer has written: “Nietzsche’s vision of Eter­
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nal Recurrence is identical with the Buddhist vision of the Void.”61 For 
both Altizer and Nishitani then, Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recur­
rence represents a complete shattering of all God-centered and man­
centered modes of being, culminating in a Yes-saying, an affirmation 
of the present moment so deep that we can will it to recur, and to recur 
eternally the same.
61 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Descent into Hell: A Study of the Radical Reversal of 
the Christian Consciousness (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 211.
62 Nishitani Keiji, ShakyO towa nanika, p. 251.
63 ibid., p. 290.
Both Altizer and the Kyoto School describe the shattering of our in­
terior or kenotic emptying of the private ego in existentialist terms as 
the “death of self.” Indeed, Nishitani understands the kenOsis or self­
emptying of the ego as representing taishi or the “Great Death” of Zen 
Buddhist enlightenment. In this context, both Altizer and the Kyoto 
School emphasize the themes common to both Christianity and Bud­
dhism whereby one realizes true life through the experience of ego­
negating death. Moreover, both Altizer and the Kyoto School describe 
the kenotic emptying of all transcendent centers as the “death of 
God.” Nishitani not only refers to Nietzsche’s proclamation that 
“God is dead”62 but also to the famous iconoclastic injunction of the 
Rinzai Sect of Zen Buddhism which declares: “If you meet the Bud­
dha, kill the Buddha!” Nishitani writes: “We have to kill the self ab­
solutely. And to do that is also to kill the Buddha.”63 Therefore, just 
as the radical Christian atheist must follow Nietzsche in actively willing 
the death of God, thereby acquiring liberation from an oppressive dei­
ty who is the transcendent enemy of the fullness and immediacy of life, 
so the Zen Buddhist must “kill the Buddha” in an effort to shatter all 
images of dualism and transcendence.
For Altizer as for the Kyoto School the “death of God” in its sense 
as the kenotic self-emptying of God into the world represents the 
radical reconstruction of Christian theology in terms of the Mahayana 
Buddhist dialectical identification of nirv&na and samsdra. In his most• •
recent book entitled History as Apocalypse Altizer explains in an 
autobiographical comment that “my doctoral work was focussed upon 
Mahayana Buddhist philosophy,” adding that
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It provided an initial arena for exploring a persuasion that I 
adopted and never abandoned: the conviction that Christian 
theology can be reborn only by an immersion in Buddhism. 
Perhaps no principle offers a deeper way into our lost epic 
and theological tradition than does the Mahayana Buddhist 
dialectical identification of Nirvana and Samsara.64
64 Thomas J. J. Altizer, History as Apocalypse, p. 2.
Hence, Altizer’s death-of-God theology like Zen Buddhist philosophy 
of the Kyoto School wholly repudiates any dualistic or transcendent 
model of reality which separates nirvana from samsGra, God from the 
world or the sacred from the profane. Through the activity of kenOsis 
or self-emptying God dies to His transcendence and becomes wholly in­
carnate as a total presence in the fullness and immediacy of the actual 
moment. Consequently, for both Altizer and the Kyoto School the pro­
cess of kenOsis whereby God empties out His transcendence into total 
immanence itself signifies what in Mahayana Buddhist terms is the 
dialectical identification of nirvana and samsGra or the complete in­
terpenetration of the sacred and the profane in the ultimate standpoint 
of sQnyatQ or emptiness.
However, it must also be emphasized that Altizer is highly critical of 
certain aspects of Buddhism, so that his own “kenotic Christology” 
should be sharply contrasted to what might be called the “kenotic Bud- 
dhology’’ formulated by Nishida, Nishitani and Abe of the Kyoto 
School in Japan. Although Altizer’s critique of Buddhism and Oriental 
mysticism pervades his various writings, it is most clearly articulated in 
the first chapter of his book The Gospel of Christian Atheism entitled 
“The Uniqueness of Christianity.’’ As indicated by the very title of this 
chapter, Altizer argues not only for the uniqueness of Christianity, but 
also for its superiority over all Asian religious traditions. According to 
Altizer, while Buddhism and other forms of Oriental mysticism involve 
a backward-moving process of returning to a primordial Totality or 
original paradise, the Judeo-Christian tradition alone involves a for­
ward-moving or eschatological process culminating in an apocalypse of 
total presence as all in all:
Whereas the prophetic faith of the Old Testament and the 
primitive faith of Christianity were directed to a future and 
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final end, and thus are inseparable from a forward-moving 
and eschatological ground, the multiple forms of Oriental 
mysticism revolve about a backward movement to the primor­
dial Totality, a process of cosmic and historical involution 
wherein all things return to their pristine form.65
65 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p. 35.
66 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Descent into Hell, pp. 200-201.
67 John B. Cobb, ed., The Theology of Altizer: Critique and Response 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), pp. 230-31.
Elsewhere he similarly writes: “If Buddhism is a way back to a full 
recovery and total embodiment of a primordial All, then Christianity is 
a way forward to a final and eschatological realization of that All.”66 
Again, in yet another work he specifically aims this same criticism at 
the Zen sect of Mahayana Buddhism, stating: “I do not see how it is 
possible, at least from a Christian or Western point of view, to avoid 
identifying Zen as a backward way to an original or primordial Uni­
ty.”67 Hence, whereas Altizer regards the Buddhist concept of sdnyatd 
as involving a backward movement of self-emptying in the sense of a 
reversion to primordial origins, the Christian idea of kenosis is unique 
in its emphasis on a forward movement of self-emptying which 
culminates in an eschaton or apocalyptic end wherein God pours out 
His total transcendence into total immanence as a final and total 
presence.
One might object here that Altizer is mistaken when he describes 
Mahayana Buddhist sunyata as involving a “backward-moving” pro­
cess of self-emptying which results in the return to a primordial Totali­
ty. In fact, it can be asserted that the Mahayana Buddhist concept of 
sdnyata denotes neither a “backward-moving” process of self-empty­
ing, but rather, it signifies an emptying out into the bottomless depths 
of an Eternal Now. For this reason, Nishida KitarO writes:
When history is regarded as extinguished in the eternal past, 
something like the Greek civilization appears, and it takes 
everything as a shadow of eternity. On the other hand, when 
history is regarded as going to, and disappearing in the eter­
nal future, something like the Christian civilization appears, 
and it takes everything as a road to eternity. When, however, 
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history is thought of as a determination in the Eternal Now, 
where past and future are extinguished in the present, then 
everything comes without a whence in its coming, and goes 
without a whither in its going, and that which, is eternally 
what it is. Such a thinking flows in the depth of the civiliza­
tion of the East, in which we have grown up.68
68 Nishida KitarO, Intelligibility and Philosophy of Nothingness, tr. Robert Shinz­
inger (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1958), pp. 158-59.
Charles N. Bent, The Death-of-God Movement (New York: Paulist Press, 1967), 
p. 199.
Consequently, even if the kenotic Buddhology formulated by 
Nishida, Nishitani and the Kyoto School is now-centered rather than 
the “backward-moving” process of certain other Asian religious tradi­
tions, it nonetheless fully lacks the forward-moving, eschatological and 
apocalyptic direction central to Christian theology in general and 
Altizer’s kenotic Christology in particular.
V
Finally, I would like to raise the problem of pantheism which arises 
in any kenotic theology, whether it is the kenotic Christology of Altizer 
or the kenotic Buddhology of the Kyoto School. Critics of Altizer’s 
kenotic Christology have often charged that it involves one of the most 
serious heresies of orthodox Christianity, namely, pantheism or the 
doctrine that God is identical with the world. For instance, in his book 
The Death-of-God Movement, C. N. Bent rather politely asserts: 
“Altizer’s dialectical and mystical understanding of God and man ex­
hibits certain pantheistic overtones.”69 In an anthology edited by John 
B. Cobb entitled The Theology of Altizer: Critique and Response 
Theodore Runyon emphasizes that Altizer employs (a) the kenosis 
passage of Philippians, (b) the doctrine of the incarnation, and (c) the 
eschatological message of Jesus to justify dissolving the distinction be­
tween God and the world, bringing God into identity with the world in 
a way is ultimately monistic as well as pantheistic. Runyon states:
AJtizer’s interpretation of the self-emptying (kenOsis) of 
Christ as the merging of God with the world may be defensi­
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ble if one is reading Paul via Hegel and Blake. But if one is at­
tempting instead to get at Paul's own orientation, then it 
would seem that for Paul the most basic sin of man is that he 
confuses God with the world.70
70 John B. Cobb, ed.. The Theology of Altizer, p.51.
71 ibid., p. 33.
71 ibid., p. 176.
In defense of Altizer’s highly unorthodox if not heretical reading of 
Paul’s kenOsis hymn John Cobb points out that Runyon fails to see in 
his critique that Altizer is part of the “new hermeneutic.” Altizer holds 
that the meaning of any text changes with the evolution of con­
sciousness. What the kenOsis hymn in Philippians 2:7 meant for Paul is 
not what it should necessarily mean today.71 The question here is 
whether or not even from a contemporary standpoint, should the idea 
of Are/iOris’ or self-emptying be understood pantheistically to mean the 
total dissolution of God into the world? According to Altizer’s pan­
theistic interpretation of Paul’s kenOsis hymn, the “self-emptying” of 
God which occurred through the Incarnation and Crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ signifies the process whereby He poured out His total 
transcendence into total immanence, thereby resulting in the complete 
dialectical identification of God and the world. Indeed, Runyon has 
aptly referred to Altizer’s kenotic Christology as a doctrine of “Incar­
nation without a stopper.”72
In sharp contrast to Altizer’s view, the kenotic Buddhology for­
mulated by Nishida, Nishitani, and Abe of the Kyoto School docs not 
involve a doctrine of pantheism. To repeat Nishida’s words cited 
previously from his essay Bashoteki ronri to shQkyoteki sekaikan (The 
Logic of Place and a Religious Worldview): “A God who is simply 
self-sufficient is not the true God. In one aspect God must be thor­
oughly kenotic (self-emptying). A God that is both thoroughly 
transcendent and thoroughly immanent... is a truly dialectical God.” 
Hence, unlike Altizer’s position whereby the divine kenOsis fully emp­
ties God’s transcendence into immanence, for Nishida God is kenotic 
or self-emptying in only one aspect of His nature, such that paradox­
ically, He is both completely transcendent and completely immanent at 
one and the same time. Consequently, directly following the above 
passage on kenOsis Nishida goes on to explicitly deny that his view is 
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pantheistic, arguing instead that it involves a doctrine of panentheism 
whereby God passes over into immanence without exhausting His 
transcendence:
My position here is not pantheistic, but rather should be 
called panentheistic. However, I am not thinking in terms of 
object logic. My position is an absolutely dialectical self­
identity of absolute contradictions. Even Hegel’s dialectic 
does not escape from the standpoint of object logic. For this 
reason the left-wing Hegelians can understand his dialectic in 
pantheistic terms. However, Buddhist prajritip&ramita 
thought can be truly said to have penetrated into this absolute 
dialectic. Mahayana Buddhism is not pantheistic as is thought 
by some Western scholars.73
73 Nishida KitarO, Bashoteki ronri to shQkyOteki sekaikan, p. 399.
Nishida, like Altizer, has been deeply influenced by Hegel’s dialectical 
theology according to which God cannot merely transcend the world, 
but must “empty Himself’’ through kenOsis and enter into self-nega­
tion. However, while Altizer remains a left-wing Hegelian who 
describes the dialectical identification of God and the world in pan­
theistic terms, Nishida shifts over to a Mahayana Buddhist logic of 
soku-hi or “is/is not” in order to articulate the total paradox of God 
whereby He is both fully transcendent and fully immanent as a self­
identity of absolute contradictions. It is this “panentheistic” theology 
expressed through a Mahayana Buddhist logic of soku-hi which 
Nishida further articulates in terms of a gyakutaiO relationship 
between the absolute and the relative, understood as a kind of “inverse 
relationality” between Buddha and sentient beings in Zen or between 
God and creatures in Christianity. Nishitani adopts a similar position 
to that of Nishida’s on this matter as is clearly demonstrated in the 
following:
The notion of seeing God in all things of the world is usually 
rejected as “pantheism” while the correct view is usually re­
garded as “theism” based on a personal relationship with 
God. However, to say that God is omnipresent includes the 
meaning that one can encounter God everywhere in the
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world. This is not pantheism in the usual sense of the term. It 
does not mean that the world is God or that God is the imma­
nent life of the world. Yet, it does mean that an absolutely 
transcendent God is absolutely immanent.74
74 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO towa nanika, p. 46.
In the final analysis, the Kyoto School would no doubt argue that 
their own standpoint is dialectically superior to Altizer*s position in 
that it enables them to maintain the absolute transcendence of God 
while simultaneously allowing for His absolute immanence through 
kenosis or self-emptying out of agapO or impersonal love. Hence, from 
the standpoint of Nishida, Nishitani and Abe of the Kyoto School in 
Japan, Altizer’s kenotic Christology ultimately falls short in that it re­
mains wedded to an abstract Hegelian logic of synthesis, whereas their 
own view is structured by a more concrete and fully dialectical 
Mahayana Buddhist logic of soku-hiox “is/is not” which alone can ar­
ticulate the absolute paradox of God.
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